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REFLECTIONS ON FAMILY FIRM GOALS 
AND THE ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Assessments of family firm effectiveness depend critically on how goals and performance 
outputs are measured. Similarly, assessments of family firm efficiency depend critically on 
how performance outputs and resource inputs are measured. We illustrate this by showing 
that the assessment of performance is affected by how different family firm goal systems are 
specified. Gaining a better understanding of these fundamental concepts gives family 
business scholars the rare opportunity to set the rules of the game about how the performance 
of family firms, and other organizations that pursue the non-financial goals of a dominant 
stakeholder, should be assessed. 
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Reflections on Family Firm Goals and the Assessment of Performance  
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most frequently studied topics in family business research is family firm 
performance (Mazzi, 2011; Wagner, Block, Miller, & Schwens, 2015). Performance can be 
measured in terms of organizational efficiency, the relationship between outputs and inputs, 
or in terms of organizational effectiveness, the relationship between outputs and goals (Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978).1 Most of the studies of family business performance conducted thus far 
focus on efficiency instead of effectiveness because they do not specify the goals to be 
achieved, the contexts within which the goals were to be achieved, and/or do not assess 
performance in terms of the extent to which the outcomes have achieved the goals. 
Assessing performance as achievement of goals is important for both family and non-
family firms, but it is even more critical for the family firms because of the multiplicity of 
goals they are explicitly or implicitly assumed to possess. For example, if a family has both 
financial and non-financial goals for the firm it owns, and one is achieved but the other is not, 
what is one to conclude about the firm’s performance? If the family business research 
community is to reach a deeper understanding of family firm performance, there is a need for 
researchers to clarify their assumptions about the goals that family firms pursue and how 
outcomes can be compared with goals to assess performance.2 Therefore, the purpose of this 
article is to discuss the implications and obstacles associated with assessing performance in 
                                                          
1 Goals can be defined in a variety of ways (Kotlar, De Massis, Wright & Frattini, 2018). In this article we view 
goals as measurable milestones sought by firm owners and managers in the continual pursuit of organizational 
purpose. As such, goals should be (1) linked to organizational purpose, (2) have an index for measurement (e.g., 
return on investment), (3) include a target to be achieved, which can include both minimum and aspirational 
levels of achievement, and (4) specify a time frame over which the goal should be achieved (Hofer & Schendel, 
1978). We focus primarily on the index and target. We do not attempt to link goals with purpose or stipulate a 
specific time frame although we largely focus on long term goals and performance.    
2 This problem exists in most of the studies that have focused on efficiency because these studies have generally 
only measured financial outputs. By contrast, non-financial outputs and non-financial goals are both usually 
treated as independent variables, and rarely treated as dependent variables. Furthermore, the distinctions in the 
literature between the two concepts is not always clear. This confusion is both unfortunate and curious since 
non-financial goals and outcomes are sometimes considered to dominate financial goals and outcomes in family 
firms (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007).    
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terms of effectiveness (goal achievement) in family firms. However, because efficiency is 
more commonly measured and is also essential, we will digress where necessary to consider 
the measurement of efficiency in family business studies. We also note that survival is 
another indicator of firm performance but since it represents a minimum rather than 
maximum condition we shall treat it as a constraint that must be satisfied for goal 
achievement. 
THE MULTIPLICITY OF FAMILY FIRM GOAL SYSTEMS 
Both family and non-family firms pursue financial and non-financial goals. Financial goals 
can be expressed in terms of Financial Value Creation (Value Creation hereafter), which we 
define as revenues minus costs, including the cost of capital.3 Scholars in economics and 
finance mainly deal with economic efficiency; but since they assume that regardless of time-
period, the goal of firms is to maximize firm financial value, which is the accumulation of 
                                                          
3 Cost of capital is a complex concept dealt with more fully in books on financial economics such as Fama & 
Miller (1972). For our purposes, we argue that covering the cost of capital, which is the cost of equity when 
there is no debt, is necessary for Value Creation in the economic or financial sense since if satisfactory returns 
on invested capital are not achieved, the suppliers of capital will eventually want to withdraw their capital and 
will definitely not be willing to supply additional capital. Thus, we define cost of capital simply as the rate of 
return required to induce continued or new investments in an enterprise (e.g., Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 
2007). By so doing, we subscribe to the theory of financial value where the cost of capital is set objectively by 
the capital market. The most important point in the financial theory of capital markets is that, although cost of 
capital is determined by the riskiness of the cash flows, it is not the total risk but the non-diversifiable 
systematic risk that is priced. It means that the total risk to which the controlling family is exposed does not 
have a simple direct relationship with the cost of capital for a family firm’s cash flows, especially if the risk is 
highly diversifiable. It also means that if the capital market values only financial benefits while owners of the 
family firm value both financial and non-financial benefits, the price that the financial market would be willing 
to pay for family firms may differ from the price at which the controlling family would be willing to sell (See 
Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman & Chua, 2012). This does not, however, mean that the cost of capital, 
although determined by the capital market, is not affected by the presence of family firms. See Osakwe, Chua & 
Chrisman (2011) and Chua & Schnabel (1986) about how together, the controlling family’s non-traded control 
block, asymmetric information due to penchant for privacy, and non-financial benefits affect cost of capital 
through the capital market’s simultaneous equilibriums in pricing information and risk. Thus, determining the 
cost of capital for family firms in an economy requires knowledge about the mix of industries, asset sizes, and 
controlling blocks held by family firms within that economy and how much information the controlling families 
tend to withhold from the capital market. The extent to which global capital markets are integrated becomes an 
issue because it determines the scope of the economy that must be considered. Although these are important 
considerations, we do not attempt to deal with them further as they are beyond the scope of our article, the 
purpose of which is to examine firm goals and firm performance in terms of goal achievement. Finally, we 
acknowledge that family firm owners may not always be concerned about the cost of capital in the short-run. 
For further insights the reader should consult Adams, Manners, and Astrachan (2004), Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 




Value Creation over time, economic efficiency is essentially the equivalent to effectiveness. 
However, management scholars have long recognized that bounded rationality makes 
maximization impossible and firms frequently satisfice by setting acceptable targets for firm 
performance over a specific time period (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947). Management 
scholars also recognize that all firms have non-financial goals presumed to yield non-
financial benefits for stakeholders (Cyert & March, 1963). Furthermore, there appears to be a 
consensus among family business scholars that family firms may also pursue goals that yield 
family-oriented non-financial benefits (FONFB).4 These goals are rarely, if ever, relevant for 
non-family firms but are considered of critical importance for family firms (Chrisman, Chua, 
Pearson & Barnett, 2012; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013).  
There are many ways the goals pursued by family firms can be specified. Below are a 
few, far from collectively exhaustive, examples of the variations possible. We express these 
in symbolic form for more clarity and to make it easier to see the differences. Furthermore, to 
simplify the exposition, we shall ignore the non-financial goals and benefits that pertain to all 
firms so that we may focus on the interplay between Value Creation and FONFB, which is 
the crux of the differences between family and non-family firms as well as among 
heterogeneous family firms (Williams, Pieper, Kellermanns & Astrachan, 2018; Kotlar, 
Signori, De Massis & Vismara, 2017).5 Finally, we assume that the ultimate goal of family 
firm owners is to optimize their utility, but that they will usually have goal targets or 
minimums believed to yield a satisfactory level of utility over a specific period, as well as 
face resource constraints that limit goal achievement.  
                                                          
4 Family-oriented non-financial benefits (FONFB) are of course closely related to the well-known concept of 
socioemotional wealth (SEW). We chose to focus on FONFB, however, because SEW is about stocks of 
affective endowments (Chua, Chrisman, & De Massis, 2015). By contrast, we are focusing on the measurement 
of goals and outputs of both the financial and non-financial varieties. Goals and outputs deal, respectively, with 
the flows of desired and actual financial and non-financial benefits accruing to families through the formulation 
and implementation of firm strategies. Therefore, FONFB which captures flows rather than stocks, better 
encapsulates the ideas we wish to express in this article even though our discussion applies to SEW as well.     
5 For the purpose of exposition, we also ignore financial goals that generate private benefits for managers and/or 
owners but do not increase Value Creation. 
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1. Financial goal in terms of Value Creation ONLY 
GOAL: Optimize Total U = UV(Value Creation) 
 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS: 
 
 Value Creation Goal Target > ∆V* ≥ 0 
 RV(Value Creation) ≤ Total resources available 
 
Where UV(.) is the utility function for Value Creation; ∆V* is the minimum level of 
Value Creation or change in value acceptable to the firm, which must not be negative to 
ensure long-term firm survival;6 and RV(.) is the resource utilization function for the 
Value Creation achieved.  
 
With this goal system, the firm pursues only Value Creation with available resources 
acting as the constraint to goal achievement. Consequently, this is the goal system assumed to 
dominate among non-family firms, notwithstanding our simplification from excluding the 
non-financial goals and private benefits relevant to both family and non-family firms.  
As noted above, a basic assumption in economics, especially financial economics, is 
that firms pursue only financial goals except when altruism is explicitly included.7 We 
express the goal system in the form of a utility function to accommodate the possibility that 
the controlling family’s welfare or sense of well-being from goal achievement will not 
increase linearly with Value Creation for reasons such as risk aversion.8 By using the term 
“optimize” instead of “maximize”, we acknowledge bounded rationality. We also specify a 
minimum and aspirational level of goal achievement to reflect the fact that firms often 
                                                          
6 We acknowledge that, in the short run, a firm does not have to be creating value to survive. In fact, in the short 
run, a firm can survive with negative accounting (or economic) profit so long as it has positive cash flows, or 
even negative cash flows so long as it can secure additional equity or debt capital through financing to meet 
short-term cash flow needs. But, in the long run, access to financial capital, even family financial capital, will 
vanish if there is no value creation. On another point, note that although we conceptualize Value Creation based 
upon economic and financial theories, our exposition of goal systems, including both the goals and the 
constraints, apply equally when using accounting profits or even cash flows as measures of Value Creation.    
7 Although economists are beginning to recognize that this assumption is not valid, most of their empirical work 
continues to be based on this assumption, perhaps because non-financial goals and outcomes are so difficult to 
model and measure. 
8 This is not the classical economics utility function based on stock but similar to the behavioral economics 
utility function such as the one used in prospect theory which is based on change or flow (e.g., Starmer, 2000). 
To measure utilities as a stock we would use financial value and socioemotional wealth (SEW) instead of Value 
Creation and FONFB. 
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specify a performance target that, if not attained, will trigger a search for alternative strategies 
to achieve the goal (Cyert & March, 1963). Note that the goal system modeled allows 
resources used to be less than resources available to accommodate slack.9 How resource 
constraints affect performance assessment will be discussed in the next section.  
2. Business-first goal system: 
GOAL: Optimize Total U = Uv(Value Creation) 
 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS: 
 
 Value Creation Goal Target > ∆V* > 0 
 FONFB > 0 
 RV(Value creation) ≤ Total resources available - RF(FONFB) 
 
Where UV(.) and RV(.) are utility functions and resource utilization functions for Value 
Creation, respectively, as defined before; and RF(.) is the resource utilization function for 
the FONFB achieved. As expressed, RF(.) reduces the total resources available for Value 
Creation. Again, to ensure the long-term existence of the firm, ∆V* cannot be negative. 
Although FONFB is a constraint that does not contribute directly to Total U, it must be 
positive to ensure some minimum level of cooperation from family members needed to 
achieve any Value Creation.  
 
The goal system for firms referred to as business-first family firms in the literature 
(e.g., Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009) includes a financial goal with a family-oriented non-
financial constraint. Although goal targets may fluctuate in the short term, over the long-term 
family firms with this goal system will need to generate a minimum level of FONFB such as 
family harmony and will expend resources to ensure this is achieved but do not consider it a 
goal and gain no direct utility from it. FONFB cannot be zero, however, because, without it, 
family harmony may suffer so much that Value Creation would be very difficult or even 
impossible to achieve. 10 Without this constraint, the situation would devolve to the financial 
                                                          
9 Firms have many different types of resources that are difficult to combine into one variable, including human, 
social, and financial capital; intangible and tangible resources; tacit and explicit knowledge, short and long-term 
assets, etc. This simplification is for representational and expositional convenience. 
10 Without a minimum level of family harmony, there will be, at least, disruption of the business. If the 
disharmony causes the family firm to split up, then split-up businesses will have less resources available for 
Value Creation and may even compete with each other intensifying the rivalry in the industry. And if the firm is 
sold to one or a few family members, repayment of the debt incurred to acquire ownership from the rest of the 
family could become the priority of the firm.    
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goal only situation. In that case, the behavior of the business-first family firm would be no 
different from that of non-family firms, making their relative performance strictly 
comparable.  
It is also important to note that if available resources are held constant, the Value 
Creation of business-first family firms is expected to be less than or equal to the Value 
Creation of non-family firms and family firms with only financial goals because a portion of 
the family firm’s resources must be diverted toward satisfying the FONFB constraint.11 
Finally, the specification implicitly assumes that the Value Creation goal and FONFB 
constraint are independent of each other, i.e., there is no complementary, substitutive, or 
conflicting effect on utility between them (Mazzelli, Kotlar, & De Massis, 2018; Zellweger 
and Nason, 2008). Trade-offs in the pursuance of goals arise entirely from the resource 
constraint, i.e., resources devoted to FONFB will not be available for Value Creation, and 
vice versa. 
3. Family-first goal system: 
GOAL: Optimize Total U = UF(FONFB)  
 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS:  
 
 FONFB Goal Target > F > 0 
 Value Creation > 0 
 RF(FONFB) ≤ Total resource available - RV(Value creation) 
 
Where UF(.) is the utility function for FONFB; F is the minimum level of FONFB acceptable 
to the firm; and RF(.) and RV(.) are resource utilization functions as defined before.  
 
The goal system for “family-first” businesses (cf., Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009) 
reverses the importance of Value Creation and FONFB. Achieving non-negative Value 
Creation is a constraint since the principals will not and cannot countenance destruction of 
                                                          
11 However, if the resources have complementary effects, the resources allocated to achieving FONFB may 
contribute to Value Creation. So, the net effect may be partially, fully, or even more than fully offset.   
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value in the long run.12 In some instances, however, family firms may be willing to sacrifice 
Value Creation in pursuance of FONFB, if satisfactory outcomes for both cannot be achieved 
(Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). In that case, 
there would be no Value Creation constraint; but we presume this would hold for only a 
transitory adjustment period because consistent destruction of value over the long-term would 
put the business out of existence and make further FONFB impossible (cf., Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012).13 As specified, our previous comments regarding independence and resource 
utilization as it pertains to Value Creation and FONFB in business-first firms applies for 
family-first firms as well. 
3. Multiple substitute goals: 
GOAL: Optimize Total U = UV(Value Creation) + UF(FONFB) 
 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS: 
 
 Value Creation Goal Target > ∆V* > 0 
 FONFB Goal Target ≥ F > 0 
 RV(Value Creation) + RF(FONFB) ≤ Total resource available 
 
Where UV(.), UF(.), RV(.) and RF(.) are utility and resource utilization functions, 
respectively, as defined before. Again, to ensure the long-term existence of the firm, ∆V* 
cannot be negative while F must be positive to ensure some minimum level of 
cooperation from family members.   
 
With this goal system, family firms have multiple substitutable goals to which the 
family attaches varying importance as expressed by the utility functions UV(.) and UF(.). The 
overall goal is to optimize the sum of the utilities received.14 The goals are substitutable 
                                                          
12 We would like to remind the reader again that we are talking about the long run. In the long run, even if the 
incumbent generation does not find value creation important, later generation family shareholders, especially 
those not involved in managing the business, may consider seriously what return they could achieve in the 
capital markets with the funds they would get from selling their shares or the business.     
13 In terms of adjustments, we should note that failure to achieve the goal targets can result in a change in the 
strategy or even a change in the goals if there is no available strategic alternative that will achieve the goal 
targets (Cyert & March, 1963). 
14 This specification has simplified the combination of utilities derived from goal achievement to a linear form. 
Adding nonlinearity would only complicate the mathematical expressions and the exposition. In addition, no 
conceptual generality is lost with this simplification. 
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because the same value of Total U can be obtained with different combinations of financial 
and non-financial goals and outcomes. 
There can be two variations of this goal system. One with limited substitutability, 
which is the version specified above. In this version, substitutability ends at the minimum 
levels required: ∆V* for Value Creation and F for FONFB. This means that when the 
business fails to achieve the minimum level for one of the two goals, performance is 
unacceptable because the utility lost cannot be made up by the utilities gained from outcome 
achieved with respect to the other goal. In an unlimited substitutability version with respect to 
FONFB, for example, the business can fail in achieving its FONFB goal but the performance 
is acceptable so long as the deficiency in FONFB is made up by additional Value Creation. 
This second version may be represented by the following system:  
GOAL: Optimize Total U = UV(Value Creation) + UF(FONFB) 
 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS: 
 
 Value Creation Goal Target > 0  
 RV(Value Creation) + RF(FONFB) ≤ Total resource available 
 
In this version, the only specification for the goal target would be the need to achieve a non-
negative level of Value Creation. Thus, the loss of utility even when FONFB is negative can 
be made up for an indefinite period by utility gains from higher Value Creation, whereas for 
reasons of long-term survival, Value Creation cannot be negative for more than a limited 
period, the length of which depends on the family firm’s resources. The difference between 
this and the Financial Goal Only system is that the latter ignores FONFB and, thus, less 
resources would have to be allocated to pursuing FONFB. A difference between this goal 
system and the Business-First or Family-First goal systems is that both Value Creation and 
FONFB contribute to the Total U in the former while only Value Creation or FONFB does 




4. Multiple positively complementary goals: 
GOAL: Optimize Total U = UV(Value Creation) + UF(FONFB)  
+ UVF(Value Creation * FONFB)  
 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTRAINTS: 
 
 Value creation Goal Target > ∆V* > 0 
 FONFB Goal Target > F > 0 
 RV(Value creation) + RF(FONFB) ≤ Total resource available 
 
Where UV(.), UF(.), RV(.), and RF(.) are utility functions and resource utilization functions, 
respectively, as defined before. UVF(.) is the utility function for the complementarity 
between Value Creation and FONFB. 
 
By two complementary goals we mean that achieving both goals yields a higher 
utility than the sum of the utilities from achieving the two goals if the goals were merely 
substitutable. Mathematically, the difference between this goal specification and the one for 
substitutable goals consists of the utility derived from the multiplicative interaction term 
which will be positive if both are greater than zero and will be zero if one or both are zero. 
This specification requires that the complementary portion of the utility function be scaled 
such that when Value Creation*FONFB is zero, that portion is zero. 
The above goal system is the simplest way to represent positive goal 
complementarity. The actual goal system of a family firm is likely to be more complex than 
this when FONFB has multiple components. For example, there may be complementarity 
among some FONFB components (Chua, Chrisman & De Massis, 2015). To accommodate 
that, the goal system specification would include multiplicative terms for the complementary 
FONFB components, such as FONFB1*FONFB2.15 
                                                          
15 A more complicated specification than the mere inclusion of a multiplicative term is needed to allow for 
negative values of Value Creation and/or FONFB. However, including these complications would not add to the 
basic understanding of goal complementarity. Furthermore, this symbolic specification cannot allow for 
simultaneous negative values of Value Creation and FONFB because it would imply that, contrary to intuition, 
negative values for both Value Creation and FONFB would yield a higher utility because the product of two 
negative numbers is positive. Finally, although negative Value Creation or FONFB outcomes do occur, we 
assume that family owners would not set out to destroy value or NONFBs as reflected in the non-negativity 
constraints for both benefits. 
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Like the situation where goals are substitutable, the presence of complementary goals 
suggests that family firms will not necessarily suffer from a performance disadvantage in 
terms of Total U vis-à-vis non-family firms just because it sacrifices Value Creation to pursue 
FONFB. In exchange for the utility lost from lower Value Creation, the family would receive 
an increase in utility from the higher FONFB. What makes the complementary goal situation 
different is that the family will receive additional utility from the complementarity effect. The 
net effect will, of course, depend on the extent to which goal complementarity exists and the 
trade-off between the utilities associated with Value Creation and FONFB. 
An interesting and unique feature of goal complementarity is that the total resources 
needed by a family firm to achieve the same level of Total U are lower than what it takes in 
all the previously discussed goal systems because the family will derive utility not only from 
the achievement of Value Creation and FONFB, by themselves, but also from the utility 
gained through the complementarity of the two. This is an important consideration because it 
implies that to the extent that goals are complementary, the resources needed to achieve a 
given level of Total U will be lower than would otherwise be the case if goals are not 
complementary. Likewise, to the extent that goals are complementary, a higher level of Total 
U can be achieved with a given level of resources than when goals are not complementary. 
Thus, if resources are held constant, family firms with complementary Value Creation and 
FONFB goals should have the potential to achieve higher levels of Total U than either non-
family firms or other family firms with different goal systems.  
As we mentioned at the beginning of the section, the above list includes just a small 
sample of possible family firm goal systems. We are confident that readers can imagine many 
variations on the ones that we listed. For example, we have specified systems where goals are 
11 
 
substitutable or complementary but not systems where goals are conflicting.16 Systems with 
conflicting goals are essentially the inverse of systems with complementary goals. Thus, for 
example, when two FONFB goals are in conflict, the achievement of FONFB1 goal will 
diminish the utility gained from achieving the FONFB2 goal and vice-versa.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILY FIRM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 
From the above discussion it should be obvious that how the effectiveness of family firms is 
assessed will depend critically on how their goals are specified. Once family business 
scholars admit explicitly that family firms have non-financial goals, then no study about the 
overall performance of family firms in terms of either efficiency or effectiveness is possible 
without measuring FONFB. Therefore, family business scholars simply cannot ignore 
FONFB. Of course, one can always say that the study is only about financial performance. 
But that means the researcher must either assume (a) family firms have only financial goals; 
or (b) non-financial goals and performance can be treated as independent variables that are 
relevant only in their impact on financial performance. In fact, most performance studies in 
the literature, rather than treat Value Creation and FONFB as parts of a system of goals and 
outcomes that together determine the effectiveness and efficiency of family firms, have made 
one of those assumptions; we are aware of few studies that use non-financial performance as 
a dependent variable separately or in combination with financial performance. The studies by 
Basco and Rodriguez (2011) and Basco (2013) are among the few exceptions. 
We, however, are not arguing that using non-financial goals as independent variables 
is inappropriate even when the research is focused exclusively on financial outcomes; what 
concerns us is the lack of studies that measure non-financial performance and the propensity 
in the literature to confuse non-financial goals and outcomes, as well as treat both exclusively 
                                                          
16 A conflict in goals is different from a conflict arising from limited resources. Technically, the former would 
be reflected in the objective function while the latter would arise from the resource constraint. 
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as independent variables. This criticism, along with the others discussed in the literature (e.g., 
Chua et al., 2015; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014; Schulze & Kellermanns, 2015) also 
applies to studies using socioemotional wealth (SEW), which is typically conceptualized as a 
stock or accumulation of affective and social FONFB but often treated (but rarely directly 
measured) more like a goal that influences behavior (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012). 
Scholars are interested in family firm performance for the ultimate purpose of 
improving the performance of the economy and the well-being of the owning family. 
Comparing family and non-family firms and comparing different family firms make it easier 
to identify the causes of performance differences. In both situations, before doing the 
comparison, scholars must first be able to assess the performance of a single firm. This 
involves conceptual and measurement problems that are discussed below.17  
Before discussing the problems of measuring non-financial goals and outcomes, it is 
important to deal with the problem of measuring resources allocated toward pursuing 
financial and non-financial benefits, which our discussion has so far ignored. First, take the 
simplest goal system that admits family firms’ pursuance of FONFB – the business-first 
situation. Non-family firms will be pursuing Value Creation exclusively while family firms 
will be pursuing Value Creation as well as attempting to maintain a minimum acceptable 
level of FONFB. Even when family and non-family firms have the same amount of total 
resources, the family firm will allocate some resources to pursue FONFB. Conceptually, even 
when performance only in terms of Value Creation is compared, it is the value created plus 
the counterfactual of how much more value family firms would have created, if resources had 
not been allocated to pursuing FONFB, that should be compared with the Value Creation 
achieved by non-family firms. In other words, to get an unbiased estimate of the relative 
                                                          
17 To avoid dealing with principal-principal agency problems which may be more serious in family firms, our 
discussion may be seen as one dealing only with firms that are 100% family owned. 
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performance of family firms in terms of Value Creation, it would be necessary to consider the 
amount of resources allocated to achieving FONFB goals before making the comparison.  
When ratio measures of efficiency (outputs/inputs) are used, this means that the denominator 
should ideally be adjusted downward to account for resources used to pursue FONFB; 
otherwise, the denominator would be overestimated.  
In a cross-sectional comparison of Value Creation using ratio measures of 
effectiveness (outputs/goals), the purpose is to assess the impact of different levels and types 
of outcomes in achieving the family firm’s goals. 18 Here, there would not be a need to adjust 
for the resources allocated to pursue FONFB because the denominator for business-first 
family firms (or, for that matter, any type of family firm) is based on goals not resource 
allocations; in fact, any adjustment would invalidate such assessment. This would avoid the 
need to deal with a counterfactual. However, the actual Value Creation (the numerator) 
achieved would still be affected by any existing FONFB constraint.  
For more complicated family firm goal systems such as when Value Creation and 
FONFB are substitutes, a firm with lower Value Creation may have derived higher FONFB 
from the business; in other words, the firm with lower Value Creation may have derived a 
higher Total U when the utility derived from Value Creation and the utility derived from 
FONFB are combined. In this case, the measure of outputs, (but not inputs) in the case of 
assessments of efficiency, and the measure of outputs and goals in the case of assessments of 
effectiveness, would need to consider FONFB. Naturally, the same logic regarding 
performance assessments when Value Creation and FONFB are substitutes also applies to 
                                                          
18 This discussion concerns itself only with measuring performance. It does not imply that resources are 
unimportant in achieving family firm goals. Indeed, the literature indicates that family firms may suffer from 
disadvantages in terms of acquiring human resources (Chua, Chrisman & Bergiel, 2009; Colombo et al., 2014) 
and have both advantages and disadvantages in acquiring financial resources (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2003, 
Wu, Chua, & Chrisman, 2007; Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Wu, 2011).   
14 
 
situations where Value Creation and FONFB are complementary or conflicting; only the 
implications for performance would differ.19  
This means that family business scholars who believe that non-financial goal 
achievement and FONFB should be figured into assessments of family firm performance 
should view the literature comparing the financial performance of family and non-family 
firms with caution. Unless one takes the stand that family firms should not allocate the 
resources they own to pursue FONFB, or that FONFB should not be measured as a 
component of performance, such studies will inevitably yield biased conclusions about the 
relative performance of family and non-family firms and of different types of family firms.20 
Some progress has been made in the conceptualization and measurement of FONFB, 
particularly with regard to the related concept of SEW (e.g., Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, 
2012; Filser et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2018). For example, Debicki, Kellermanns, Pearson, 
and Spencer (2016) have validated a socioemotional wealth importance (SEWi) scale that 
specifically acknowledges SEW as a goal; whereas Hauck, Suess-Reyes, Beck, Prügl, and 
Frank (2016) have validated a scale that seeks to measure SEW as an accumulation of 
affective benefits. Nevertheless, there is still no clear consensus about what the relevant 
                                                          
19 When financial and non-financial goals are substitutable, complementary, or conflicting, no adjustment in the 
total amounts of inputs would be necessary since all resources are used to achieve the mixture of financial and 
non-financial goals of the firm. Therefore, using ratio measures of efficiency would only require adjustments to 
reflect FONFB in the numerator.  
20 Economists might insist that for reasons of economic welfare all firms should adhere to and be evaluated by 
utility functions that maximize Value Creation only. But such a position seems to us to be the antithesis of 
democracy built on foundations of individual liberty and property rights. Put differently, if controlling families 
derive utility from pursuing FONFB goals, who has the right to say that is wrong? Moreover, if we are to 
improve family firm performance, should we not consider the goals family owners are trying to achieve? It 
should be noted that some economists have started to consider non-financial outcomes such as happiness as a 
valid measure of resource-use productivity (e.g., Frey & Stutzer, 2002), reviving, in effect, the earliest 
conceptualizations of utility (See Stigler, 1950). Indeed, the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to 
Richard Thaler for his work showing that psychology influences decision making and that the goals of human 
decision makers consist of much more than purely financial wealth maximization. Interestingly, in his award 
citation, the prize committee focused on self-control agency problems concerning inner conflicts with oneself 
that arise when a decision maker’s preferences are influenced by multiple and conflicting financial and non-
financial goals at the same point in time (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). This idea is central to the study of family firm 
behavior and performance given the prevalence of inner conflicts between financial and non-financial goals 




family-oriented non-financial goals are or how FONFB should be measured. Even if it was 
assumed that we know what the FONFB are, how to measure them, and the resources that 
must be allocated to produce them, there are still differences in how family firm performance 
should be assessed in accordance with different goal systems such as those discussed above. 
In other words, we need an approach that is powerful enough to accommodate differences in 
the goals and associated outcomes of family firms in comparison both to non-family firms 
and to each other.  
The problem of different goal systems is further complicated by the fact that Value 
Creation is usually measured in monetary terms using profit, Tobin’s Q, or one of the various 
financial performance ratios, whereas how to measure FONFB is currently much less clear, 
despite the recent advancements in the literature mentioned above. Moreover, assuming we 
could measure FONFB, the way in which that measure could be reconciled with the typical 
measures of Value Creation is neither clear nor easy. The most obvious solutions on how to 
derive a composite measure of these disparate concepts are to convert both into utilities or to 
convert FONFB into a monetary equivalent.  
Although at first glance, taking either approach will encounter difficult-to-surmount 
obstacles, the easiest way to convert goals and outcomes to something that approaches 
utilities is to measure the importance attached to different goals and the satisfaction attached 
to their achievement. Unfortunately, this approach must be used with great care for two 
reasons. First, the common approach of multiplying importance and satisfaction hides 
relevant distinctions. Thus, mathematically, the product of high values of importance 
multiplied by low values of satisfaction can equal the product of low values of importance 
multiplied by high values of satisfaction. Second, neither importance nor satisfaction actually 
measures the goal target. This means that to ensure the scales are comparable across firms, 
the levels of the goal target must be measured, either absolutely or in relation to some 
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benchmark or threshold (e.g., some level of average family harmony or family member 
commitment). If this can be done, it might be possible to calibrate differing levels and types 
of goal importance and satisfaction with goal achievement across firms.  
In terms of converting FONFB to a monetary value, Zellweger, Kellermanns, 
Chrisman, and Chua (2012) have already shown that family business owners appear to attach 
monetary equivalent value to SEW.21 They show that the monetary price at which family 
business owners would be willing to sell their family firms to a family successor, when 
presumably the family would retain the financial value and the stock of SEW, is lower than 
the price at which they would be willing to sell their family firms to outsiders, when 
presumably all SEW would be lost and only financial value realized. This means that the 
difference between the two might be interpreted as the monetary value of SEW. Thus, 
measuring the monetary value of SEW or the stock of FONFB might indeed be possible.  
In general, so long as we have an appropriate proxy for SEW or know how to measure 
it, comparing the combined financial and non-financial performances of family firms vis-à-
vis non-family firms or among themselves may be done using a two-step regression 
procedure. The first step is to determine how much SEW contributes to the combined 
financial value and stock of non-financial benefits created by the business. This result may 
then be used to construct effectiveness or efficiency measures for comparing the performance 
among family firms and between family firms and non-family firms.  
The first step has already been demonstrated by Zellweger et al. (2012). With a 
sample of family firms, we would regress the price that the family would demand if the 
business is to be sold to non-family investors (when presumably all SEW associated with the 
business would be lost to the family and, as a result, the family would demand the monetary 
                                                          
21 Although there is no conclusive evidence that SEW includes all FONFB, we use SEW to represent the stock 
of non-financial benefits available to family firms and continue our representation of FONFB as a flow. In this 
sense, SEW may be seen as the accumulation of FONFB. 
17 
 
equivalent payment for that loss) against SEW as the independent variable and other 
determinants of firm value as control variables.22 The coefficient obtained for the SEW term 
would be a consensus measure of the monetary equivalent of a unit of SEW. Then, so long as 
we know how to measure the SEW of a business, the SEW for an individual firm multiplied 
by this coefficient would give us a consensus measure of what the firm’s SEW contributes to 
the combined financial value and non-financial benefits created by the business, stated in 
monetary terms.  
The monetary equivalent value that each family would attach to FONFB and SEW 
should be different and likely idiosyncratic, which the consensus monetary equivalent value 
obtained using this approach is obviously not. Instead, the monetary equivalent value for 
SEW estimated using this approach would reflect the consensus demand price in the “market 
for family businesses” for the combined financial and non-financial value if the business was 
sold to another family that could preserve for themselves, without loss, the SEW (i.e., 
accumulated stock of FONFB) by the selling family.23 But this may not be a crucial problem 
because conclusions flowing from the comparison of performances are about averages 
anyway and despite its flaws this approach represents a place to start.  
In a cross-sectional comparison of performance, we would then construct the total 
financial value and SEW created by a family firm (flows) in monetary terms over the period 
examined. This Total Value would be the sum from adding the monetary equivalent value of 
the SEW to the purely financial value of the firm. The comparison of performance between 
family firms and non-family firms or among family firms would then be done through a 
second-step regression model with the Total Value as the dependent variable and either a 
                                                          
22 Zellweger et al. used past, present, and future control to measure SEW. Other measures are possible but 
whichever is chosen the valuation by the family will be subjective. Its cardinal reliability must be examined 
rigorously first if this approach is to be used. It would likely be influenced by the willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept concepts pointed out by Zellweger et al. (2012).  
23 How much this is and whether families can get it when they sell their businesses is an important and 
interesting topic for research. 
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binary family involvement variable or a variable combining measures of family involvement 
and family essence as the independent variable. The control variables would be other drivers 




If we were pessimistic, we would consider surrendering in the face of the difficulties 
outlined above. We, however, believe that family business scholars should be cautiously 
optimistic and even enthusiastic because what we have outlined helps conceptualize the 
problems we face in more concrete terms and provides some initial directions for how the 
field can potentially establish a new game in family business performance research. Family 
business scholars have the rare opportunity to control the academic discourse about family 
firm performance by setting the rules of the game with respect to measuring and comparing 
family firm efficiency and effectiveness in terms of both financial and non-financial goals 
and outcomes.  
Family business studies as a separate field has been legitimized through research that, 
despite its limitations, has shown that family firm behavior is different from that of non-
family firms (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). While further 
accumulation of evidence is still important, family business researchers need to dig deeper 
into the motivations of such distinctive behavior (e.g., De Massis et al., 2014) if they are 
serious about understanding family firms and developing a theory of the family firm. 
Achievement of FONFB and its aggregation as SEW is generally believed to be one of these 
                                                          
24 Again, this ignores the non-financial and private benefit goals shared by owners and managers of family and 
non-family firms. The approach may also be used to study differences between family and non-family firms or 
among family firms in terms of the performance consequences of a change in behavior, a decision, or an action. 
However, this would require us to measure the changes in FONFB by comparing the FONFB before and after. 
The first step would be the same. But continuing the above example, in the second step of the regression 
analysis, the dependent variable would have to be the changes in the efficiency or effectiveness ratios for the 




strong and unique sources of motivation of family firms. Understanding the nature and 
measurement of these goals and outcomes will benefit not just the field of family business 
studies, but also other research areas such as stakeholder theory, social entrepreneurship, and 
any other area where one or more dominant stakeholders, with non-financial goals oriented 
toward their own interests, are encountered.  
To use a cliché, a thousand-mile journey starts with the first step, which is to identify 
the FONFB. As noted above, recent studies by Debicki et al. (2016) and Hauck et al. (2016) 
show promising directions and approaches to do this since the scales they developed will help 
measure SEW goals and accumulated outcomes, respectively. However, we recommend that, 
at this stage of our knowledge about FONFB, the data collected should be as broad and 
inclusive as possible and not be limited to those proposed in the SEW literature. Focus 
groups, clinical experiments, interviews with family firm stakeholders, and surveys should be 
used to help us determine the comprehensiveness of our list of FONFB and whether the 
components of SEW proposed in the literature include all FONFB. After that, the next step 
would be to examine the cardinality of the scales developed – can the scales be used to 
measure changes in the stock of FONFB singly or in the catch-all form of SEW? This is 
because we need to measure the desired flows or changes in the stock of FONFB to capture 
FONFB goals, whereas we need to measure the actual flows or changes in stocks to measure 
FONFB outcomes and output. When we, as a community, have done that, we will finally be 
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